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The St. Augustine Hurricane of 1811:
Disaster and the Question of Political Unrest
on the Florida Frontier
by SherryJohnson
"On the 5th of October a violent hurricane hit this city, It
caused terrible damage to the houses in town . . . . The
destruction is so great that these poor people are entirely
ruined."l

S

o wrote Spanish East Florida's interim governor Juan Josi de
Estrada on December 5,1811. The hurricane could not have
occurrebd at a more inopportune time. During the previous
three years, Spain had suffered an unprecedented series of catastrophes. In 1808, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the country,
usurped the monarchy, and placed his brother Josef on the
throne, thus creating a crisis of legitimacy throughout the Spanish
empire. Political confusion led to economic uncertainty as revenues from Spanish America to the metropolis were halted. At the
same time, aggressive American expansionism encouraged attacks
SherryJohnson is associate professor of history at Florida International University.
She is very grateful to the Historic St. Augustine Research Foundation at Flagler
College, whose generous grant funded the research for this article. An early version of this study was presented at the meeting of the Southern Historical
Association in Memphis in 2004. Many thanks are also extended to Jack Davis, Jay
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1. Juan Jose de Estrada, interim governor of East Florida, to Marquks de
Someruelos, captain general of Cuba, St. Augustine, 9 December 1811, legajo 1570B, Papeles Procedentes de Cuba (hereafter PC), Archivo General de
Indias (hereafter AGI), Seville, Spain.
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along the border between the United States and the Spanish
colonies. One such invasion was the attempted seizure of East
Florida by General George Mathews and his followers in March
1812.~Within the chaos of the Spanish empire and threatened
with invasion from Georgia, the October hurricane had the potential to be the last straw in a series of misfortunes that swayed popular sentiment in favor of the invaders.
This article studies the sequence of political events leading up
to the invasion, focusing on Estrada's interim administration.
During the last decades of the eighteenth century, Spanish
Caribbean officials developed policies of disaster mitigation, and
by 1811, Spanish subjects had come to expect certain responses
from the men in charge. Estrada's political behavior and especially his response to the crisis caused by the hurricane will be used as
a benchmark to evaluate the refusal of East Florida's citizens to
rally to Mathews's cause.
In the years following Hurricane Andrew's strike upon South
Florida in 1992, scholars' observations regarding political, economic, and social behavior have produced a body of literature
about the aftermath of disaster and its ramifications. Once the
danger had passed, people emerged from their shelters, thankful
to be alive, and then asked, "Who is in charge and will they provide
what I need?" These needs varied from life-saving measures to providing food and water to maintaining order by stopping looting
and lawlessness in the political vacuum after the storm. Such
research also produced some fundamental premises about
the effect of catastrophes on human behavior. First, disaster has a
"leveling" effect. Surrounded by death and destruction, social distinctions evaporate in the struggle for survival. In addition,
John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 17001808 (Oxford, Eng., 1989); Raymond Carr,
Spain: 1808-1 939 (Oxford, Eng., 1966);Josep Fontana, La crisis clel antiguo rigimen, 1808-1833 (Barcelona, Spain, 1979); Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the
Birth of Modern Spain (New York, 1965); Charles J. Esdaile, Fighting Napoleon:
(Sumrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 180&1814 (New Haven, Conn.,
2004); Timothy E. Anna, w i n & the Loss of Ammiccz (Lincoln, Neb., 1983);
David Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the "Spanish Miracle, " 1700-1 900
(Cambridge, Mass., 1996);John R Fisher, Commercial Relations between Spain
and Spanish America in the Era of Frte Tmcle (Liverpool, Eng., 1985); idem,
"Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy,"Journal of Latin Amaican
Studies 13 (May 1981): 21-59; James G. Cusick, The Other War of 1812: The
Patriot War and the A k a n invasion of Spanish East I.&ida (Gainesville, Fla.,
2003); Rembert W. Patrick, Izlorida Fiasco: Rampant Rebe& on the G e q i a - W d a
Bmder, 1810-1815 (Athens, Ga., 1954).
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disaster contributes to and/or heightens a "we-they" mentality.
This sense of solidarity can be anything from neighbors banding
together to protect their neighborhood from looters to a feeling of
privilege and exclusivity for years afterward as fellow survivors of a
traumatic event.3
Scholars also found that a strong causal relationship exists
among the demands of the population, inadequate governmental
response to the crisis, and political unrest. On one hand, if the
community's needs were met, the reaction would be cooperation,
gratitude, and strong feelings of loyalty to the existing regime. On
the other hand, indifference and incompetence fostered resentment, resistance, and/or revolt. Disaster, then, allowed certain
groups to press their advantage with the authorities while hostile
elements often seized the opportunity and fostered rebellion.*
Using disaster studies as an analytical tool also forces the
researcher to approach evidence from a different perspe~tive.~
Familiar chronologies must be discarded because disaster does not
conform to historically-imposed frameworks. Quite to the con3.

4.

5.

Walter Gillis Peacock, Betty Hearn Morrow, and Hugh Gladwin, eds.,
Hurricane Andrew: Ethnin'ty, Gender, and the Socwlogy of Disasters (New York,
1997); Eugene F. Provenzo Jr. and Asterie Baker Provenzo, In the Eye of
Hurricane Andrav (Gainesville,Ha., 2002).
Richard Stuart Olson and Vincent T. Gawronski, "Disasters as Critical
Junctures? Managua, Nicaragua 1972 and Mexico City 1985," International
Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 21 (March 2003): 535; Richard Stuart
Olson, "Towards a Politics of Disaster: Losses, Values, Agendas, and Blame,"
Intenaathd J o u m l of Mass E-s
and Disasters 18 (August 2000): 265-87;
Richard Stuart Olson and A. Cooper Drury, "Un-Therapeutic Communities:
A Cross-National Analysis of Post-Disaster Political Unrest," International
J o u m l of Mass Enmpncics and Disasters 15 (August 1997): 221-38; A. Cooper
Drury and Richard Stuart Olson, "Disasters and Political Unrest: An Empirical
Investigation,"Journal of Contingencies and Ckis Management 6:5 (September
1998): 153-61.
Recent scholarship on the impact of hurricanes includes Stuart B. Schwartz,
"The Hurricane of San Ciriaco: Disaster, Politics, and Society in Pueno Rico,
18941901," Hispanic American Historical Reoieur 72 (August 1992): 303-34;
idem, "Hurricanes and the Shaping of Circum-Caribbean Societies" Florida
H ~ ~ e 83
l (spring 2005): 455-82; SherryJohnson, "The Rise and Fall
of Creole Participation in the Cuban Slave Trade, 1789-1796," Cuban
StudiRF/Estudios C u b a m 30 (1999): 5475; idem, "Climate, Community, and
Commerce among Florida, Cuba, and the Atlantic World, 17841800,"Ebrda
Historical Quarterly 80 (spring 2002): 455-82; Louis A. Perez Jr., Winds of
Changc: Hurricanes and the TransfMtirm of Nineteenth-Catury Cuba (Chapel
Hill, N.C., 2001); Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: T h Unnatural History of Natural
Disasters in America (Oxford, Eng., 2000); Matthew Mulcahy, Hurricanes and
Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624-1783 (Baltimore, Md., 2005).
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trary: more often than not, the disaster was the contributing factor
that set political and economic processes in r n ~ t i o n . ~Yet, even
when disaster was not a catalyst for political change, historians can
infer much about community values by the absence of an identifiable political shift.
Such was the case in East Florida, notable because of
Mathews's failure to rally Spanish subjects to his cause. The general and James Monroe's disingenuous administration expected
that the crisis in East Florida would encourage residents to rise up
and welcome Matthews's Georgians as liberators. As historian
James G. Cusick ably demonstrated, however, this was not the case;
instead the province degenerated into factional warfare among the
Georgians, people living in Florida who supported or were forced
to support them, and residents who were steadfastly loyal to Spain.
Cusick's study is a major contribution to a recent genre of revisionist scholarship about the Second Spanish period. Long characterized as a destitute backwater, Florida has been the subject of
an ever-growing body of literature that is gradually redefining the
importance of the province within the context of a wider Atlantic
world.'
6.

Richard Lobdell, "Economic Consequences of Hurricanes in the Caribbean,"

Reuieu of Latin American Studies 3 (1990): 178-96; Virginia Garcia Acosta,
"Introduction," Hktcnia y desmtres en A m - c a Latina, 2 vols. (Mexico City,
7.

1996), 1: 15-37.
Cusick, Other War of 1812. For examples of historiographic attention to
Florida in the Atlantic world, see Jane G. Landers, Black Society in Spanish
Florida (Urbana, Ill., 1999); idem, ed., Colonial Plnntations and Economy in
Florida (Gainesville, Fla., 2000); Amy Turner Bushnell, Sztuudo and Sabana :
Spain's Support System for the Residw and Mission Provinces ofFlonda (New York,
1994); Patricia Griffin, MuUet on the Beach: The Minorcans in Jbrida, 1 764-1783
(Jacksonville,Fla., 1991); Ligia Maria Bermudez, "The Situado: A Study in
the Dynamics of East Florida's Economy during the Second Spanish Period,
178518 2 0 (M.A. thesis, University of Florida, 1989);James G. Cusick, "Across
the Border: Commodity Flow and Merchants in Spanish St. Augustine,"
M d a Historical Quarter4 69 (January 1991): 277-99; Susan R. Parker, "'Men
Without God or King': The Rural Planters of East Florida," Jbrida Historical
Quarterly 69 (January 1991): %25; Christopher Ward, "The Commerce of East
Florida during the Embargo, 1806-1812: The Role of Amelia Island," Florida
Historical Quarter4 68 (October 1989): 160-79; SherryJohnson, "The Spanish
St. Augustine Community, 17841795: A Reevaluation," W d a Historical
Quarterly 68 (July 1989):27-54; idem, "Marriage and Community Construction
in St. Augustine, 17841804," in Fbdu 's Heritage of Diversity: Essays in Honor of
Samuel &tor, eds. Mark D. Greenberg, William Warren Rogers, and Canter
Brown Jr. (Tallahassee, Fla., 1997), 1-13. El Escribano: The journal of the St.
Augustine Historical Society (1988) was dedicated to the different cultures that
vied for existence during Florida's Second Spanish period (17841821).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol84/iss1/5

4

Johnson: The St. Augustine Hurricane of 1811: Disaster and the Question of

Drawing upon the foundation provided by disaster, climate,
and environmental studies, this article evaluates events in East
Florida within a transnational context. It establishes the continuity of Spanish government and society by situating events on the
Florida frontier within the wider context of political processes in
the Hispanic Caribbean from the 1760s through the Estrada
administration, proposing a direct correlation between government responses to disaster in Florida to those during similar, earlier periods of environmental stress in Cuba in the 17609, 17709,
and 1790s.* The point of congruence is the experience of royal
officials who were in charge of implementing imperial policies of
disaster mitigation. Juan Jose de Estrada represented a long line
of men who were the first responders to disaster for ffity years. The
strategic decisions that he made before and after the hurricane
reassured citizens of East Florida that, even in a world gone crazy,
familiarity and continuity would prevail.
According to scientists who study the history of climate, the
long-term conditions that set the stage for the hurricane of 1811
began in the mideighteenth century. Climatologists have determined that the earth cycles through warm and cold periods. One
such cold period, termed the Little Ice Age, began around 1550
and concluded circa 1850. Around 1750, an anomaly lasting
approximately fifty years caused an upward spike in the earth's
temperature, leading in turn to certain global weather consequences. Among these consequences were increased El Niiio
acti~ity.~
Until the winter of 1983, when devastating floods hit northern
Peru, an El Niiio was unknown to all but a small group of scientists
and geographers. The phenomenon begins with a warming of
8.

9.

Sherry Johnson, The Social Transfmation of Eighteenth-Century Cuba
(Gainesville, 2001); idem, "El Nilio and Environmental Crisis: Reinterpreting
American Rebellions in the 1790s," paper prepared for the Third Biennial
Allen Morris Conference on the History of Florida and the Atlantic World,
February 2004, Tallahassee, Fla.; James Gregory Cusick, "Spanish East Florida
in the Atlantic Economy of the Late Eighteenth Century," in Landers, ed.,
Colonial Plantations, 168-88; idem "The Impact of the Spanish American
Liberation Movements on the Inhabitants of Spanish East and West Florida
(18081814)," paper presented at the Southern Historical Association
Conference, Memphis, November 2004.
C6ar N. Caviedes, El Nifio in History: Storming through the A p (Gainesville,
Fla., 2001), 14650, 201; idem, personal communication to author, 24
October 2000. It is increasingly clear that the climate in the 1760s through
circa 1800 was exceptional. Climatologists have verified a minute upward
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tropical Pacific waters that leads to torrential rainfall along the
Pacific coasts of the Americas. Scientists quickly realized that El
Niiio events were recurring and their effects not limited to the
Pacific region. Other tropical zones-including Mexico, the
Caribbean, and sub Saharan Africa-were hit by severe and prolonged drought. Worse still, the end of an El Niiio event did not
relieve environmental stress. Researchers discovered that El Niiio
has a malevolent twin sister, La Niiia, that follows her destructive
brother in the form of increased hurricane activity in the Caribbean
and Atlantic basin. In some ways La Nifia is worse because it affects
tropical regions already stressed from El Nifio events.1°
The combined effect of the heightened El Niiio/La Niiia
sequence is ecological crisis in the Caribbean, and the consequences transcend political boundaries, even in the contemporary
United States and Europe. The significance of this series of ecological disasters cannot be overstated as no aspect of life is unaffected. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, political,
economic, social, religious, and cultural institutions came under
assault as the environmental crisis took its toll. All European imperial powers struggled to cope, but Spain was particularly hard hit
because its empire extended over such a large area. Mercantilistic
economic policy demanded the empire be self-sufficient, but the
system broke down when one cog in the wheel, Mexico, suffered
extensive severe drought and could not provide sufficient food for
fortified Caribbean cities.l

spike in the earth's temperature in scientific sources such as deep-core samples of glaciers, soil samples, and dendrochronology; see S. Huang,
"Integrated Northern Hemisphere Surface Temperature Reconstructionn;
W.H. Quinn and V. T. Neal; "The Historical Record of El Niiio Events in
Climate since AD 1500," in R. Bradley, "Climate Since AD 1500 Database,"
both available through Paleoclimatology Program, World Data Center for
Paleoclimatology, Boulder, Colo., 1992, National Oceanographic and
website
at
Administration's
Paleoclimatology
Atmospheric
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo. See also NOAA's website on historic hurricanes based upon J o g Fernindez Partagiis's lifelong dedication to collecting such data at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov.
In his chapter entitled "Altered States: From El Niiio to La Niiia," in El Nifio
in Hzktq, 14671, Caviedes described the correlation between El Niiio and La
Niiia, originally termed "anti-niiio."
Sherry Johnson, "El Niiio, Environmental Crisis, and the Emergence of
Mary
Alternative Markets in the Hispanic Caribbean 1760s-1770s," WiEliam 13
Quarterly 62 (July 2005): 365410;Enrique Florescano, Precios de maiz y crisis
agnlcola era Mixico (I708-1810)(Mexico City, 1969), 60, 72-75.
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FLORIDA
HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY
From the 1'750s through the early 1780s, Spain was obliged
to develop a coherent metropolitan policy to respond to repeated environmental crises. In the beginning, government officials
in a disaster-stricken area intervened and initiated recovery
efforts instead of doing nothing or relying upon the church to
take care of victims, as it had in the past. Faced with food shortages, Spain gradually abandoned mercantilism and increasingly
came to rely upon North Americans, particularly Philadelphia
merchants, for provisions. Trade regulations were set aside to
help residents recover, and victims of hurricanes received concessions ranging from cash payments to relief in the form of a
moratorium on taxes and tithes. Areas of the empire that
escaped devastation were expected to contribute to recovery
elsewhere.12
As metropolitan disaster relief policy evolved over a fifty-year
period, local authorities learned the best way to respond to a hurricane through trial and error. It was beneficial, then, that by the
time the Floridas returned to Spanish dominion in 1784, the
men who governed the province had accumulated decades of
experience in formulating and implementing disaster mitigation
policy in the Caribbean. Prominent among these future leaders
was career officer Vicente Manuel de Zispedes, who became the
first governor of East Florida in the Second Spanish period.
When the Floridas were ceded to Great Britain in 1763,Zbpedes
had been serving in Pensacola. Recalled to Havana, he became
commander of the Third Battalion of the fixed regiment of
Havana, a post he held until he was reassigned to Santiago de
Cuba as interim governor in the 1770s. In the 1780s, he received
promotion to the post of Inspector General of Troops of the
island before being named governor of East Florida in 1'784.
Zespedes's successor, second governor Juan Nepomuceno de
Quesada, served for years in the Caribbean prior to his appointment in Florida. Among Quesada's first assignments was the lieutenant governorship of Puerto Principe (modern-day Camagiiey)
during the early 1780s. He went on to become governor of
Honduras, a particularly difficult position that required constant
34

12. Ibid. This article is part of my larger study that ties together the significance
of these phenomena, El Niiiolc Atlantic World R$mcussirms in the Age of
Revolution (in progress).
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vigilance against repeated British encroachments to cut logwood.
He succeeded Zispedes in 1790. The highest ranking military
officer who served under both Zispedes and Quesada was the
commander of the Third Batallion of Cuba, Bartolorn6 de
Morales. A native of Algeciras in southern Spain, Morales arrived
in Havana in the 1760s and subsequently was posted to Santiago
de Cuba. In the 1770s, he was selected by the captain general of
Cuba, the Marquis de la Torre, to transfer to Havana and take a
position in governmental administrative offices. Morales's long
career in the Cuban theater included service in Florida from the
1780s through 1801.13
With the cession of Florida to Britain in 1'763, Florida's military families had evacuated to Cuba. Florida-born infantry off&
cer Diego de Le6n, Colonel Alvaro L6pez de Toledo, and his son
Antonio were inducted into the fixed regiment of Havana immediately upon arrival in Havana in 1764. There they joined other
officers under the command of Vicente de Z6spedes. In the
1770s, one of Florida's senior officers, ayudante mayor (adjutant
major) Francisco de Le6n became commander of one of the forts
that guarded Havana, the Castillo de la Punta. Artillery members
Sergeant Bernardo Pirez and Corporal Salvador de Porras were
transferred into the Artillery Corps of Havana and settled in the
southern portion of the town, where most artillerymen and their
families resided. After serving sixteen months in Florida, the
Compaiiia de Fucileros de Montaiia de America remained virtually intact in its new posting in Puerto Principe, where Juan de
Quesada served as commanding officer in the 1780s.14
One of the most visible examples of continuity between the
Floridians and the command structure in Cuba was the mounted
cavalry unit, which did not exist until the Florida unit was transferred to Cuba. Captains Antonio Ferngndez and LorenzoJosk de
Le6n, and Lieutenant Ildefonso SPnchez Casahonda retained positions in the newly-created Mounted Cavalry of Havana. They
served under the command of one of Cuba's most celebrated
officers, French-born Antonio de Raffelin, a veteran of many

13. Johnson, Social Transfmmatimt, 3496.
14. Idem, "Casualties of Peace: Tracing the Historic Roots of the Florida-Cuba
Diaspora, 1763-1800," Colrial Latin American Histmica1 Reuieu 10 (winter
2002): 91-125.
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European campaigns and one of the most capable and trusted offcers in the caribbean.15
Through continued service in Cuba, the Floridians came to
the attention of superiors whose patronage could do much to further a man's career. When an anchorage was authorized at
Bataban6 in the 1770s, Antonio L6pez de Toledo was chosen to
lead the garrison and militia unit that guarded the new port. At
the far western end of the island, a watch tower arose to provide
advance warning against the approach of an enemy fleet.
Floridano Antonio FernQndezheaded the detachment of mounted cavalry and sewed as lieutenant governor of a post that became
even more important after Spain's entry into the American
Revolution in 1779. At the other end of the island in Baracoa, the
crown relied upon Floridians such asJose Hormytiner, who by the
17809, served as lieutenant governor of that remote town.16
It was only natural that many sons followed their fathers' and
grandfathers' footsteps in military service. In August 1764, two of
the four E p e z de Toledo brothers, sons of the captain who
became the commander of the outpost at Bataban6, were inducted into the newly-created Noble Corps of Cadets of Havana. The
brothers were joined by Juan and Joaquin de Landa, sons of Diego
de Landa, who also transferred from St. Augustine in 1764.
Similarly, the children of Raymundo de Arrivas, a captain of the
infantry from Arkvalo in Spain, and wife Ursula de Avero, widow of
peninsular Captain Diego de Repilado and from a family of long
standing in Spanish Florida, perpetuated the familial tradition.
Like the L p e z de Toledo and Landa brothers, son Francisco de
Arrivas and stepsonJosC de Repilado, from Ursula's first marriage,
were immediately inducted as cadets into the fixed regiment of
~avana.
Joining the military community in Havana were several
extended family networks who had provided goods and services to
the garrison. Contrary to popular belief, the majority of Floridians
15. Idem, Social Transfitirm, 57, 71-84, 89, 113. Raffelin's service to the
Spanish crown dated to the 1760s when he participated in European campaigns. In 1763, he was emissary to Jamaica where he worked out the details
of the British departure from Havana; see "Empleos . . . Colonel D. Antonio
RaEelin," Havana, 31 December 1786, cuaderno 13, legajo 7259, Guerra
Moderna (hereafter Guerra),Archivo General de Simancas (hereafterAGS) .
16. Johnson, Social Transfmtirm, 71-84.
17. Ibid.
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were not resettled in Ceiba Mocha and left to an uncertain fate.
Instead, the Sinchez, Rodriguez, GonzPles Montes de Oca,
Cordero, Espinosa, Hita y Salazar, and Ruiz del Canto families,
among many others, relocated in the villages and barrios (neighborhoods) in and around Havana where they prospered in spite of
being exiled from their homeland. Floridanos Antonio Marin,
Lorenzo Rodriguez, and Miguel Chapiiz regularly visited a settlement of Minorcan Catholics south of St. Augustine at New Smyrna.
These men carried messages back and forth, thus providing information about the status of the British garrison in St. Augustine and
about the conditions of family properties to the former owners in
Cuba. Ships' captains Francisco Ruiz del Canto and Joaquin
Escalona, members of a complicated kin network formed among
Floridanos in Havana's Santo Angel parish, served both as agents
and ambassadors by promoting contact and commerce with
Florida's west coast Indian groups.18
The floridano officers and countless men of lesser rank served
in the army in Cuba for three decades under commanders such as
Zhpedes, Quesada, Raffelin, and Morales. They were in the vanguard when Spanish forces under Bernardo de GPlvez recaptured
Pensacola from the British in 1781.19 When Florida returned to
Spain, these men were logical choices to make up the contingent
of troops whose task it was to return the province to Spanish rule.
Floridanos who had left as junior officers in 1763 combined their
service assignments and returned as the commanders of several
regiments on the first fleet of ships. For example, Antonio L6pez
de Toledo, whose father Alvaro had relinquished at least three
town lots, returned as a lieutenant colonel and the head of the

18. Idem, "Casualties of Peace," 91-125. For Ruiz de Canto, see Francisco Ruiz
del Canto, "Relaci6n . . . ,* Havana, 6 April 1779, legajo 1242, PC, AGI. For a
discussion of Ruiz del Canto's successful reconnaissance missions, see
Cummins, Spanish Obsmm, 9698.
19. Among the Floridanos who participated in the Pensacola expedition were
Antonio de Toledo, son and grandson of the distinguished military family;
Antonio FernPndez, former lieutenant governor of Nueva Filipinas; Manuel
Castilla, son-in-law of Antonio Fernhdez; and Pedro Caxne and Pablo
Catafal, sons-in-law of Rayrnundo de Arrivas; see "Empleos, Antonio de
Toledo," 31 December 1788, folio 50, expediente 2; "Empleos, Antonio
Fernhdez," 31 December 1786, folio 4, expediente 13; "Empleos, Manuel
Castilla," 31 December 1788, folio 60, expediente 2; "Empleos, Pedro Caxne,"
and "Empleos, Pablo Catafal," 31 December 1788, Expediente 1, all legajo
7259, Guerra, AGS. See also, Johnson, Social Transformation, 37-96.
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Fixed Regiment of Cuba. Antonio FernPndez, former commander of the strategic outpost at Nueva Filipinas and participant in
both Pensacola expeditions, headed the Mounted Cavalry.
Youngest son of the Arrivas family, Tadeo, received a position in
the treasury. Men with maritime experience in guiding ships over
the sandbar in St. Augustine's harbor were in great demand, and
the families of ship captains Diego de Miranda, Antonio Marin,
Joaquin Escalona, Lorenzo Rodriguez, and Miguel Chapiiz were
among the first to return. Ship's captain Josk Berm~dezprofited
from his knowledge of the Florida waters on both sides of the
peninsula. Civilians such as Tomas Cordero, Lucia Escalona, and
Juana Navarro all journeyed to St. Augustine upon the retrocession of the city to press their property claims.20
The significance of these vast interconnected family networks
with personal and professional obligations goes beyond the obvious. In every case, these families had strong and unbreakable ties
to Florida that extended far beyond the narrow and isolated world
so often envisioned by scholars of the Second Spanish period.
They were also creatures of their environment; military tradition,
honor, loyalty, and family were of paramount importance.
Decades of experience in Cuba meant that these men and women
were prepared to weather the political intrigues that accompanied
change in monarchy in 1788 and the economic crisis that plagued
the Spanish empire after 1790. Their decades in Caribbean service also meant that they were well aware of how the metropolis
chose to respond to disasters. Not only had they sunived two
decades of inordinately severe hurricanes, they were part and parcel of creating the policy that sought to mitigate disaster and minimize the possibility of political unrest. Fortunately for Florida,
they brought their experience with them.21
Twenty-seven years later, on April 13, 1811, amid political
uncertainty and economic chaos, the man who had succeeded
Juan de Quesada as governor in 1796, Enrique White, died. The
rules of emergency succession established that the senior ranking
military official, Estrada, take control of the province. The choice
was auspicious. Juan Josi de Estrada came from one of the most
20. Johnson, "Casualties of Peace," 121-24.
21. Idem, Social T r a n s f e t i o n , 164-80. For an examination of the impact of hurricanes in the fint years after Spain regained East Florida, see idem, "Climate,
Community, and Commerce."
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distinguished families in military service in Cuba. His father,
Pedro de Estrada, was among the senior leaders defending against
the British siege and occupation of Havana in 1762. As was customary, Juan Josi and his brother Ignacio followed their father
and grandfather into militaty service. Maintaining the tradition of
extending family influence within the ranks, their sister Barbara
married Colonel Antonio de Raffelin. In doing so, the Estrada
family became inextricably linked to the Florida exile community
because RaEelin commanded the mounted cavalry company that
included so many Florida soldiers.22
Estrada was aided by a cadre of experienced and competent
subordinates. Chief engineer Manuel de Hita y Salazar was from a
notable floridano family whose service to the Spanish crown went
back several generations. The commander of the post at
Fernandina, Justo Josi L6pez de Toledo, was the youngest son of
the family that had evacuated in 1764. Too young to join his
brothers when the Noble Corps of Cadets was formed, youngJusto
Josi subsequently was inducted into the cadet corps, and by 1811
he, too, held a position of prominence in the Spanish imperial
army. The civilian community was strengthened by second and
third generations of Floridians, many of whom had intermarried
with prominent Minorcan families.23

22. Idem, Social Tramfinmution, 15469; White Deaths, 13 April 1811, reel 284L,
Cathedral Parish Records (hereafter CPR), Diocese of St. Augustine, micre
film copies in P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida,
Gainesville; Amalia A. Rodriguez, ed., Cinco diarios del sitio de Ea Habana
(Havana, Cuba, 1963), 238; Glia Maria Parcero Torre, La pkrdzda de la
Habana y h refmas Bddnicas en Cuba (1 76@1773) (Madrid, Spain, 1998),
162-64; Con& de Macun'ges v. Igzacio deEstrada, Cou~~cil
of the Indies, Madrid,
1July 1786, expediente 15, legajo 1141, Audiencia de Santo Domingo (hereafter SD),AGI; "Matrimonies de Espaiioles," 5 October 1773, Libro 7: 17711794, S.M.I., Catedral de San Crist6bal de la Havana, Havana, Cuba; Relaci6n
por antigiiedad de la oficialidad, sargentos y cadetes del Esquadrbn de
Dragones de America Fixo de esta Plaza . . . ," Havana, 31 December 1786,
cuaderno 13, legajo 7259, Guerra, AGS. RafTelin, Antonio FernPndez,
Ildefonso SPnchez, and Ignacio de Estrada all served together in this unit.
23. Manuel de Hita y Salazar to Enrique White, 1 November 1803, bundle
171B14, reel 74, East Florida Papers (hereafter EFP), Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, microfilm copies in P.K. Yonge Library; "Regimiento
Infanteria de la Havana, Indice General . . . ," Havana, 31 December 1786,
cuaderno 12, legajo 7259, Guerra, AGS; Census Returns, Census of 1786,
Census of 1793, bundle 323A, reel 148, EFP. See also, Griffin, Mullet on the
Beach; idem, "Blue Gold: Andrew Turnbull's New Smyrna Plantation," in
Landers, ed., Colonial Plantations, 39-68.
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Being surrounded by colleagues with considerable talent and
experience worked in Estrada's favor because his ascent to the governorship was not without challenge. When White died in April,
ranking militiuy officials and bureaucrats in the province convened a junta de gutma (war council) to legitimate Estrada's succession as interim governor. Although in 1794 the Ministry of the
Indies had specifically mandated that the line of succession went
to the ranking military officer, nonetheless, on May 14th a dispute
broke out among the principals of the junta de guerra: Manuel de
Hita, chief of the engineers; Ignacio Salem, chief of the artillery
corps; and Manuel Lbpez, the chief treasury official. L6pez (not
related to the L6pez de Toledo family) opposed Estrada's control
of the treasury since his experience was limited to military matters,
but the two officers voted against the bureaucrat, and Estrada
assumed the full responsibilities of his position.24
The question of access to treasury funds was particularly
urgent because, by 1811, Florida faced the same dismal and uncertain economic future as the rest of the empire. Ever since Josef
Bonaparte had usurped the Spanish throne, Mexican silver remittances had been suspended to deprive the usurper access to the
main source of Spanish revenue. As a consequence, the financial
crisis extended throughout the Spanish empire. In some cases,
Florida's soldiers and contractors who supplied the garrison had
not been paid for several months, and Estrada begged the captain
general of Cuba, the Marques de Someruelos, to send Florida's
annual situado (subsidy) to relieve the "utter misery" of the resident~.*~
The one bright spot in the economy was the booming lumber
and cotton business in Fernandina, yet many of the prominent
families who lived in the northern town held their land under very
tenuous circumstances. Faced with few options, Estrada devised a
solution to fill East Florida's empty treasury that would also serve
as a conciliatory gesture to the frontier residents whose loyalty was
questionable. His idea was to revive the liberal immigration policies of the 1'790swhen widespread land grants attracted hundreds
of settlers from the southern United States. In June, Estrada wrote
to Someruelos suggesting that he be allowed to sell some of the
24. Estrada to Someruelos, 14 May 1811, St. Augustine, legajo 1570A, PC, AGI.
25. Bermddez, "Situado,"3959, 66; Cusick, 0 t h War of 1812, 44-45; Estrada to
Someruelos, 19June 1811, St. Augustine, legajo 1570A, PC, AGI.
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extensive lands held by the crown to "suitable people* in the hope
of remedying the "miserable state of the province." While Estrada
waited for a reply from Havana, his plan attracted considerable
attention from another quarter: that of General Matthews, camped
across the St. Mary's River in Georgia. In July, word reached St.
Augustine that the enemy leader has issued a proclamation offering to give every white man fifty acres of land once his conquest of
the province was accomplished. The general also promised that
those who joined his cause would be assured of the enjoyment of
their religion and the protection of their private property.26
Although the settlement plan is usually attributed to Mathews, the
original idea belonged to Estrada, and Mathews's proclamation
was an undisguised effort to counter its effect and attract supporters among rural East Florida's settlers.
By the end of July, the situation in St. Augustine was deteriorating. Expecting an attack at any time, Estrada desperately tried
to convince Someruelos of the gravity of the situation. St.
Augustine's troop salaries were months in arrears, and the units
were seriously undermanned. Making matters worse, Estrada's best
officers had been allowed to stay in Cuba on temporary assignment. One of them, Manuel de Castilla, the son-in-law of Antonio
Ferngndez, took advantage of his family's influence and extended
his "medical leave" in Havana where he had been since 1808.
Former governor White had not pursued the issue, possibly since
the situation in Florida was less volatile than in Cuba or other areas
such as Mexico, but by 1811, Estrada could no longer ignore the
threat that gathered across the border. Still, the silence from Cuba
was deafening, and once again, Estrada wrote to the captain general asking that Castilla and three other senior officers be returned
to Florida. At the least, he stressed how desperately he needed
reinforcements. Again, the captain general failed to respond to
Estrada's request, so the governor tried new tactics. He went over
Sorneruelos's head and wrote directly to the Viceroy of Mexico asking that Florida's situado be sent to the province. In addition,
Estrada decided to send an emissary to plead his case with
Someruelos in person. Engineer Manuel de H i t . had been
assigned to a new position in Santo Domingo. En route, he had to
26. Cusick, Other War of 1812, 44-46,62-63; Estrada to Someruelos, 19 June 1811,
St. Augustine, legajo 1570A, PC, AGI; John Houston McIntosh to William
Craig, St Maxy's, 23July 1811, bundle 147D12, reel 61, EFF'.
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pass through Havana, and he took Estrada's ominous warning to
the captain general. The message was brutally honest: "If you do
not make all haste to find a way to contain the intrigues and seductions, and if you do not send me enough money to pay the troops
and royal employees who are growing increasingly disgusted
because they have not been paid in so long, I fear that His Majesty
will lose this very important part of the empire."27
Among the intrigues Estrada needed to contain were
Mathews's attempts to befriend Seminoles in the interior of the
peninsula. As the crisis deepened on the frontier, Estrada made
some strategic choices with the few resources available to him and,
beginning in July, began to distribute the annual g&ts to nine
Seminole villages. The cost of providing presents such as cloth,
tobacco, powder and flints, farming and hunting implements, and
liquor, was an expenditure that Estrada could ill afford, but the
loyalty of the Seminole tribes was vital to Spanish victory. The
main Seminole settlement in Alachua under the leadership of
Chief Payne could mobilize 125 g w n w o s (warriors); Bowlegs's village, Guacapote, had 32 guerreros; and that of Onosquy in
Mosquitos could provide 35 men if they decided to join the
Spanish effort. Even if the Seminoles remained neutral, it would
be preferable to them joining the enemy. Estrada had already
decided to begin the annual distribution-undoubtedly with s u p
plies furnished on credit from St. Augustine's merchants-when a
welcome surprise arrived from Cuba. At the beginning of
September, twelve thousand pesos arrived on the ship from
Havana. While hardly sufficient to compensate for the deficit in
Florida's sztuado, the payment was better than nothing, and if spent
strategically could convince the Seminoles of their goodwill. The
coming months would prove the money to be well spent.28
27. Estrada to Someruelos, 14 May 1811, St. Augustine, legajo 1570A; Estrada to
Someruelos, 4 July 181 1, St. Augustine, legajo 15'70A;Estrada to Someruelos,
1 August 1811, St. Augustine, legajo 1570A, all in PC, AGI; Lany R. Jensen,
Childm of Colonial Despotism: Press, Politics, and Culture in Cuba, 17W-1840
(Tampa,Fla., 1988.), 37-40; J o d Luciano Franco, Politica continental americana
de Espaiia a Cuba, 1812-1830 (Havana, Cuba, 1947), 11-27; Cusick, Other War
of 1812, 767'7; Matthew Childs, T o End this Empire of TyrannyJ:Sluvery,
RebeElion, and I h t i l y in the Cuban Aponte Conspiracy of 1812 (forthcoming
2006) promises to be a welcome addition to the historiographic literature.
28. "Estado de 10s Yndios que han percivido Regalo en el aiio de 1811," St.
Augustine, 14 September 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, EFP; Estrada to
Someruelos, St. Augustine, 16 September 1811, legajo 1570B; Estrada to
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Yet, the arrival of part of the annual subsidy also came with disappointing news. Someruelos refused to allow Estrada to sell land
to American settlers. Recalling that the generous land grants in
the 1'790s had reaped nothing but ingratitude and rebellion, the
captain general reminded Estrada that a Royal Order of 1804 prohibited United States citizens from residing in East Florida. A follow-up order issued in 1806 was even more specific: "no continuen
por ningun pretext0 las ventas de tierras a extrangeros" or "under
no circumstances [may you] continue to sell land to foreigners."
Citing both orders, Someruelos told Estrada that he had no choice
in the matter as it had been settled by the Ministry of the Indies
years before.29
Amid the threat of invasion and financial crisis, on October
5th, St. Augustine was struck by a violent hurricane. From all
accounts, it is probable that the storm made landfall from the east
during daylight hours. It seems to have been a fairly compact
storm since the worst destruction was confined to St. Augustine
and the city's surrounding area. The greatest damage was caused
by flood water, a killer wave known in modern terminology as the
storm surge, that rose over a community that was especially vulnerable since it was built on low-lying land and surrounded by
water. As the hurricane intensified, the Matanzas and North Rivers
that make up Matanzas Bay combined with those of Maria Sanchez
Creek, creating a wall of water laden with debris. Fueled with the
wreckage of houses and other buildings that fronted the bay, the
storm surge was transformed into a battering ram that even the
most substantial structures could not withstand. Small boats and
dinghies broke away from their moorings and floated through the
streets and in the main square, the Plaza de Armas. As the waters
continued to rise, "the residents fled from their homes in fear for

Someruelos,St. Augustine, 2 September 1811, legajo 1570B, both in PC, AGI,
The latter letter acknowledged the arrival of the money "with extreme gratitude." For background, see Richard K. Murdoch, "Indian Presents: To Give
or Not to Give: Governor White's Quanda~y,"M a Historical @ M y 35
(April 1957): 326-46. On pages 33G37, Murdoch reproduced the list of the
types of presents distributed to chiefs, waniors, women and children. The
Seminole villages had 326 men who were potential warriors, 337 women, and
385 children. See also Cusick, Other War of 1812,21325;James W. Covington,
The Seminoles of Flon'da (Gainesville,Fla., 1993), 28-35.
29. Someruelos to Estrada, Havana, 14 September 1811, legajo 1570B, PC, AGI.
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their lives looking for any secure place to save themselve~."~~
At
the height of the storm, land and water would have been indistinguishable.31
Only the oldest residents of St. Augustine recalled the previous
hurricane that hit the province directly in 1775 when the city was
a British possession. In the 1780s, hurricanes grazed the Florida
coastline, but none directly damaged the city or its dwellings. The
men in royal service, however, had lived in Cuba when the island
suffered sequential, devastating storms. As soon as the immediate
danger passed, Estrada and a contingent of troops went out into
the streets to evaluate the damage and render emergency aid.
Among his first acts was to contact four comkarios del barrio, chosen
before the disaster for their competence, judgment, and standing
in their community, who were responsible for patrolling the streets
and maintaining order in their neighborhoods. Among these four
men were JosC Sgnchez and Juan Gonzblez Montes de Oca, comisarios of barrios Yglesias and Castillo, respectively. Both were old
Floridanos who had lived in Cuba as children and returned to St.
Augustine in 1784. Joaquin Sbnchez, comisario of barrio
Contaduria, had also lived in Cuba and arrived with the return of
Spanish rule. Gaspar Papy was a respected senior member of the
Minorcan community and was the comisario of barrio Quarteles.
Estrada met each man and ordered him to implement emergency
post-hunicane procedures.52 Then, aided by regular troops and
militia members, their job was to visit every household in their
area, inspect property damage, evaluate losses, and turn in a report
that would begin the process of recovery.
30. Estrada to Someruelos, St. Augustine, 6 December 1811, legajo 1570B, PC,
AGI. Justo G p e z wrote to Estrada from Fernandina two days after the humcane relating how the strong storm had caused significant flooding. He did
not include any reports of damages or casualties, which suggests that the
northern town received the outer bands of the humcane where the intensity
would have been minimized; see Justo Gpez to Estrada, Fernandina, 7
October 1811, bundle 147D12, reel 61, EFP.
31. The similarities between the St. Augustine hurricane and the deadliest humcane in United States history, the Galveston hurricane in 1900, are striking.
The major difference is the number of casualties in the Galveston storm, obviously because the Texas town had so many more people; see Nathan C.
Green, The Stmy of the 1900 Galveston Hurricane (1900; reprint, Gretna, La.,
2000); Isaac Monroe Cline, S t m , h a % and Sunshine: An Autobiography
(Gretna, La., 2000); Casey Edward Greene and Shelly Henley Kelly, eds.,
Thmgh a Ntgfrt of H m :Voicesfromthe 1900 Galveston S t m (College Station,
Texas, 2000).
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As the four comisarios spread out to check on their neighbors,
the magnitude of the destruction became etident. The greatest
damage occurred on the streets fronting the harbor, Calle de la
Marina (Marine Street) and portions of Calle San Carlos
(Charlotte Street) where virtually every household reported total
damage. Spaniard Ger6nimo Alvarez, who was the royal baker,
lost seven houses valued at three thousand pesos that he owned
free and clear in the southern portion of town in the barrio
Quarteles. The loss represented his life's savings. He had arrived
as a single man and royal employee with the first returnees in 1784.
In his nearly three decades of residence in St. Augustine, he had
married into the Minorcan community, raised a family and prospered, but by the evening of October 5, all that he and his family
had worked for was damaged or destroyed. His neighbor, Jose
Garcia, also lost everything when the flood waters carried away his
residence and the greater portion of his store. Reports from the
other end of town in the barrio Castillo echoed the reports of total
destruction. Among the casualties were three contiguous properties on the waterfront owned by Manuel FernQndez Bendicho.
Even though it was not directly on the waterfront, a substantial twostory stone house on St. George Street owned by Maria Castafieda,
widow of the royal caulker Juan Siinchez, was seriously damaged;
her losses were calculated at 575 pesos. 33

32. William Bartram, The Travels of William Bartram, ed. Mark Van Doren (1928;
reprint, New York, 1955), 311; Griffin, "Blue Gold," 39-68; Johnson, "Climate,
Community, and Commerce," 455-65; Gaspar Papy, "ReIaci6n . . . Barrio
Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811;Joaquin Sinchez, "Relaci6n . . .
Barrio Yglesias," St. Augustine, 15 October 1811;Jos6 Sgnchez, "Relacibn . . .
Banio Contaduria," St. Augustine, 23 October 1811;Juan GonGles Montes
de Oca, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Castillo," St. Augustine, 21 October 1811, all
bundle 198C16, reel 84, EFP. Two hurricanes that struck Cuba from 1766
through 1804 were similar to the St. Augustine storm. The 1772 triple hurricanes in Santiago de Cuba caused the island's largest river to flood for almost
the entire winter of 1772-1773. Rainfall from the June 1791 hurricane in
Havana caused mudslides and flooding in the Chorrera (today the
Almendares) River to the west of the city, claiming over three thousand lives.
33. Papy, "Relaci6n . . Barrio Qparteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Census Returns, Census of 1793, 3, 62, 123, bundle
323A, reel 148; Store Licenses, St. Augustine, 7 September 1790, bundle
180A14, reel 77; de Oca, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Castillo," St. Augustine, 21
October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, all in EFP; Mariano de la Roque,
"Descripci6n del Plano de la Ciudad de San A p t i n " typescript copy in P.K.
Yonge Library, 87,88,89,237,252.
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Another particularly vulnerable area fronted the Plaza de
Arrnas in the center of town where houses and business establishments were directly exposed to the rising waters of the bay. The
mercantile house of Forbes & Company lost commercial effects
valued at seven hundred pesos, and a neighboring store and
counting house were totally ruined. The house that served as
Governor Estrada's residence sustained considerable damage, and
its private well was contaminated. Merchant Bernadino Sinchez's
house and store, located on Calle San Carlos, sustained a loss of six
hundred pesos in damage to his house, household, and cuxnmercia1 goods."
The force of the storm surge and the speed with which it overwhelmed the city is evident in the graphic testimony of the victims.
Bartolorn6 de Castro y Ferrer told comisarioJoaquin Sinchez that
his house and outbuildings in barrio Iglesias "were inundated by
the bay waters and immediately everything was carried away."
Before the storm, Rafael Diaz owned a casa & mam.postmu on
Marine Street, a house made of stone and rubble construction.
When the water retreated, all of Dih's property was gone including his house, clothing, lumber that he had stored for building,
and all of his professional tools.
Master carpenter Martin
Hernindez and his family lost half of their wharf and all their
household furnishings valued at 2,250 pesos. At the other end of
the town, the dock belonging to Maria Coruiia washed away along
with her orchard and the fence surrounding it. Wooden structures
such as houses, storehouses, and docks were particularly vulnerable, and if located on or near the water, their destruction was
almost universal.35
34. Josi Snchez, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Contaduria," St. Augustine, 23 October
1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, EFP; Joaquin Srinchez, "Relacicin . . . Barrio
Yglesias," St. Augustine, 15 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, EFP;
Roque, "Descripcibn del Plano" probably 146 and 14'7,both listed as Sinchez
fa+ properties. Joaquin Snchez reported that "the residence of governor
Estrada belonged to Maria del Carmen Shchez," which suggests that Estrada
was not living in the governor's official residence, possibly because he knew
his tenure as governor was temporary.
35. Joaquin Snchez, "RelaciBn . . . Barrio Yglesias," St. Augustine, 15 October
1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Census Returns, Census of 1793, 103, bundle
323A, reel 148; Josk Sainchez, "Relacicin . . . Barrio Contaduria," St.
Augustine, 23 October 1811, bundle 198616, reel 84, EFP;Papy, "Relacicin . .
. Barrio Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811,bundle 198616, reel 84,
all in EFP. Castro y Ferrer's many properties were valued at 3,500 pesos. For
example, in Barrio Quarteles, one owner alone Carlos de Ceta lost eight

Published by STARS, 2005

19

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 84 [2005], No. 1, Art. 5

Moving away from the waterfront, the nature of damage
changed. In the western blocks of the city, the fences and cercas
(walls) around properties sustained the most damage, reflecting
the storm's progress and the city's topography. Since the storm
approached from the east, the blocks closest to the bay flooded
first. Although most of St. Augustine lay at sea level, there was an
almost imperceptible rise in elevation towards the center of the
town.36 The streets nearest the water (Marina and San Carlos)
were at sea level while the entire length of St. George Street was
between six and eight feet higher. Thus, structures along St.
George Street were spared while waterfront properties were
destroyed. In addition, accumulated debris from the destroyed
structures probably piled up at the high water mark against cercas
and fences in the western blocks and buffered homes in the interior of the city. Among the many residences that lost fences were
those occupied by Antonio Royo in barrio Quarteles, and Pedro
Cosifacio in barrio Contaduria. Nonetheless, homes and properties farther inland did not escape damage altogether as hurricane
force winds destroyed what flood waters spared. Windows in the
governor's house, rare because they were made with glass panes,
were shattered by wind and flying debris. Several blocks in barrio
Quarteles at the south end of town may have suffered a tornado or
a microburst. There a cluster of homes in close proximity belonging to Bartolome Suiirez, Martin Odeir, and Magdalena Mestre,
and three additional houses belonging to priest Miguel Crosby lost
chimneys in the storm.37

wooden houses on Calle de la Marina valued at 3,000 pesos; see Papy,
"Relaci6n . . . Barrio Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle
198C16, reel 84, EFP. The authoritative work of St. Augustine construction
is Albert Manucy, The H w s of St. Auptine, 1565-1821 (1962; reprint,
Gainesville, Fla., 1992), 62-73. In all cases, definitions are taken from this
seminal work.
36. Carl D. Halbirt, "New Evidence of St. Augustine's 16th-Century Cultural
Landscape," paper presented at the 55th Annual Meeting of the Florida
Anthropological Society, Tallahassee, 2003. For the importance of enclosures
see Manucy, Houses of St. Augustifl~,128-31, 155.
37. Papy, "Relacibn . . . Barrio Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Josi Snchez, "Relacidn . . . Barrio Contaduria," St.
Augustine, 23 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Joaquin Siinchez,
"Relacibn . . . Barrio Yglesias," St. Augustine, 15 October 1811, bundle
198C16, reel 84, all in EFP. Additionally, for SuPrez, see Census Returns,
Census of 1793,94, bundle 323A, reel 148, EFP. For the importance of enclosures see Manucy, Houses of St. Augustine, 128-31, 155.
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The hurricane spared no one, regardless of race, status, or
wealth. Close to the cluster of houses that lost their chimneys lived
several free families of color, including morena Ana who told
comisario Gaspar Papy that she lost her wooden house and the
fence surrounding the property. Her moreno neighbor Antonio
lost part of his "tiny wooden house" and its enclosure, and moreno
Abraham's house was spared even though he lost his kitchen.
Another neighbor, Andres, was lucky that he only lost the fence
around his property, and pardo Benjamin Segui, an officer in the
free black militia, had serious damage done to his house and
enclosure. Another cluster of homes that sustained extensive damage was located within the Minorcan quarter near the Castillo de
San Marcos. Properties belonging to Juan Gianopoly, Pablo
Sabate, and Andrks Llopis, among many, suffered losses worth
hundreds of pesos.38
Not only was a large sector of the community left homeless,
but an immediate problem arose in finding food. The wind
stripped fruit-bearing trees owned by petty farmers and producers
west of town who provided foodstuffs for the city. One of many
examples was widow Magdalena Maria who reported that winds
destroyed a large quantity of her oranges valued at fifteen hundred
pesos. Several households reported damage to gardens and planting grounds, exacerbating both immediate and long-term problems with the food supply. Manuel Solana's losses included his
buildings, fruit trees, and crops valued at twelve hundred pesos.
His barrio Quarteles neighbor Antonio Canovas also lost fruit trees
and crops. Similarly, Francisco Triay and his stepson Jos6 Bayao
38. Papy, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio (tuarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811,
Bundle 198C16, reel 84; Census Returns, Census of 1813, bundle 323A, reel 148,
both in EFP; Cusick, Other War of 1812, 232. Juan Gianopolylsloss was 480 pesos,
Pablo Sabate's was 400 pesos, and Andrks Llopis's was 275 pesos; see de Oca,
"Relacibn . . . Bamo Castillo,"St. Augustine, 21 October 1811,bundle 198616, reel
84, EFP. For background on the Minorcan community, see Griffin, M u l . on the
Beach. Whether the free moreno Abraham who lived in town in 1811 and the
famous Seminole advisor to Micanopy are the same person is unclear; see Jane G.
Landers, "Free Black Plantations and Economy in East Florida, 17841821," in
Landers, ed., Colonial Plantutions, 128; Brent R. Weisman, "The Plantation System
of the Florida Seminole Indians and the Black Seminoles during the Colonial Era,"
in Landers, ed., Colonial Plantations, 13649, and especially the portrait on page
144. Unlike the myriad definitions used to classify non-Europeans on the Spanish
mainland, racial classification of people of African blood in Cuba and Florida was
a tripartite system: pardo/parda (light skinned or mulatos); moreno/morena, (literally "brown") darker in color but not black; and negro/negra (black).
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reported that their fence and fruit trees were down, but also that a
quantity of boniato was destroyed by flooding. In addition, hogs,
chickens, ducks, and geese perished at a considerable loss to their
owners, including Bartolorn6 Lleonardy who reported the loss of
his "animales de pluma," along with clothing and crops.3g
In the aftermath of the hurricane, the necessities of life such
as bread became difficult to obtain as both the supply of flour and
the kitchens and ovens to bake the bread were destroyed. Juan
Poma placed great value on a half-barrel of spoiled white flour,
while Juan Gornier reported that his oven was damaged along with
the total loss of his house. Many of the petty shopkeepers in town
who sold imported comestibles saw their businesses ruined as rain
and wind destroyed their inventories and stores. For example, in
addition to his house Estiban Benet lost sugar, tobacco, and other
valuables for a total loss of one thousand pesos, and Rafael
Andreu's tobacco and liquor was valued at forty-five pesos. Several
of these small shops belonged to women such as Mariana Sanz, the
widow of Antonio Berta, who owned a shop on Marine Street that
she and her late husband had operated for years. She calculated
over five hundred pesos in damage to her store, garden, and furniture. Ynis Ginerino, widow of Mariano Lasaga, lived in one of
the flooded properties near the Plaza de Armas. Her residence
survived, but her commercial establishment suffered the loss of
twelve boxes of expensive white sugar and a barrel of coffee.
Ginerino's neighbor Susana Connor received extensive damage to
her wooden house, and she also lost a cask of vinegar and a cask of
apardien te.40

.

39. Papy, "Relaci6n . . Barrio Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84;Jose Snchez, "Relaci6n . . . Contaduria," St. Augustine,
23 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Census Returns, Census of 1793,
45, bundle 823A, all in EFP; Roque, "Descripcidn del Plano," 17579,185,243,
259, especially 215,26041 for properties owned by Roque Lleonardy in 1788.
In barrio Contaduria, Pedro Trope lost fence, trees, and animals worth 150
pesos; see Jose Shchez, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Contacluria," St. Augustine, 23
October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, EFP. All of this damage was in the
southern part of town.
40. Jd
Shchez, "Relacidn . . . Barrio Contaduria," St. Augustine, 23 October
1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Papy, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Quarteles," St.
Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Census Returns,
Census of 1793,27,49, bundle 323A, reel 148; Store Licenses, St. Augustine,
7 September 1790, bundle 180A14, reel 77, all in EFP; Roque, "Descripci6n
del Plano," 97.
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Those who survived the storm's horror and the dreadful aftermath, faced a rebuilding process hampered by a lack of supplies
and implements. Before the disaster, many households piled lumber in yards that they intended to use to expand houses or make
repairs. Five hundred feet of freshly cut lumber belonging to
Francisco Marin became part of a wall of debris. Comisario Jos6
S5nchez took time out from his duties of helping his neighbors to
enumerate his lost lumber, his fence, and his fruit trees at 840
pesos. In addition to her house, Madgalena Mestre lost a large
quantity of lime that was the basis for masonry construction. By
the 1780s, the once-plentiful lime had become a scarce commodity. The productivity of the town was also seriously hampered for
weeks to come. Luis Gernaiz lost the tools of his trade as shoemaker, and the royal armorer, Benito Reynal, no longer had a
building in which he fabricated armor and weapons for the troops.
Another of St. Augustine's primary jobs was fishing, and almost
universally the storm swept away boats and dinghies docked along
the waterfront, including those belonging to Pedro de Cala in barrio Quarteles and Gabriel Perpall in barrio C o n t a d ~ r i a . ~ ~
Gathering such detailed data had been standard operating
practice since 1'768 when a very destructive hurricane hit Havana.
Part of the evolving policy of disaster mitigation was prompted by
Enlightenment initiatives to gather as much imperial information
as possible, but the quest for knowledge was also a part of a comprehensive defense strategy inaugurated after 1'763. In case of an
enemy attack, all able-bodied males between the ages fifteen and
forty-five were required to present themselves for militia
This policy was simply incorporated into post-hurricane relief
41. Papy, "Relacicin . . Bamo Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811,
Bundle 198616, reel 84;Jos6 Sanchez, "Relacicin . . Barrio Contaduria," St.
Augustine, 23 October 1811, Bundle 198C16, reel 84, "Census of 1793," 11,
bundle 323A, reel 148 both EFP. For the importance of lime as a building
material, see Manucy, Houses of St. Augustine, 20,44, 66-67.
42. Estado que compehmde las hgracias que cawd el huractin el dia 15 a2 octubre en la
ciudad & la Havana (CXdiz, Spain, 1768); Estado que compehen& h lasgracias
que caw6 el huracdn el dia 15& octubre en la ciudad & la Havana (Madrid, Spain,
1769), legajo 1594, SD, AGI; Manuel Casado Arbon&, "Bajo el signo de la militarizaci6n: las primeras expediciones cientificas ilustradas a America (1735
1761),"in La ciencia espaiiola en Utramar (Madrid, Spain, 1991), 19-47; Manuel
Lucena Salmoral, "Las expediciones cientificas en la 6poca de Carlos 111
(1759-1788)," in La cinzcia espafiola en Ultramar, 49-63; Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba,
1753-1808:Crown, Military, and Society (Knoxville, Tenn., 1986), 2449;
Johnson, Social Transfmation, 3848, 60-70.
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measures. Once Estrada announced a state of emergency, militia
members joined regular troops from the Castillo de San Marcos,
fanning throughout the town to clear debris, recover bodies, and
render aid wherever necessary.
Women, children, and the infirm were exempt from such obligations. Instead, they received special consideration. The reports
submitted by four comisarios demonstrate sensitivity and compassion to the less fortunate members of the community. In barrio
Castillo, comisario Juan Gonz5les Montes de Oca identified
Domingo Marin-single, poor, and blind-and Francisco Arnau
Jr., who was "demented" and lived in poverty with his wife and six
children. Living in barrio Contaduria, Antonio Montes de Oca
had a son in his household who was paralyzed, thus less would be
required of him than other men. Enumerators were especially
thorough when tabulating the losses of widows, particularly poor
widows with daughters or minor children to support. Antonia
Fornaris listed as "a poor widow with a daughter who is also a
widow living with her," lost her house, fruit trees, and vegetable
crops valued at two hundred pesos. Mariana Tudorina and her
three grandchildren survived the storm, but her stone house,
store, inventory, and fruit trees did not."
Two of East Florida's oldest families resided in the most dangerous zone near the water; their homes were devastated by the
violent storm. Josi Maria Gbrnez, who returned from Cuba, and
his son and daughter lived on San Carlos Street. He lost his house,
all of the family's clothing, and trees around the property, leading
comsario Jose SBnchez to describe the family as being "comparatively poor." Gcimez's daughter Brigida lived in a contiguous prop
erty with her eight children-two boys and six girls-and their
house suffered a similar fate. Within the space of a few hours,
twelve people were homeless and penniless. Gmez's cousin,
Luisa Ruiz del Canto, was also among the victims. Like her
cousins, Luisa was from one of the most distinguished families in
St. Augustine. Her father, Francisco Ruiz del Canto, played a pivotal role as a messenger during the American Revolution between
Florida Indians and Spanish authorities in Havana. Because of his
-

43. de Oca, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Castillo,"St. Augustine, 21 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Papy, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Quarteles,"St. Augustine, 26
October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Jose SBnchez, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio
Contaduria,"St. Augustine, 23 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, all in

EFT.
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bravery, Bernardo de Giilvez could count on Indian allies in 1781
when he defeated the British at Pensacola. In 1397, Ruiz del
Conto married Lieutenant Juan de Pierra from the Third
Batallion, but the couple's license limited her ability to receive a
widow's pension. The hurricane, then, was a devastating blow, and
in the aftermath, she begged to be granted a pension based on her
father's and husband's services. With six minor children and all of
her dowry spent on trying to cure her husband of the numerous illnesses that plagued him during his service in East Florida, Ruiz del
Conto suddenly became one of the neediest residents of St.
A~gustine.~~
Given reactions to previous hurricanes in Cuba and Louisiana,
it is safe to speculate about St. Augustine in the hurricane's immediate aftermath. As soon as the storm passed, Estrada was out
among the victims, giving orders to the four comisarios del barrio
to begin emergency measures. Regular military and militia assembled in work groups to recover and bury the dead, and to begin
clearing the debris and fallen trees. All men-white, free colored,
and slave alike-joined in the tasks at hand. Simultaneously, messages would have been sent to the interior, Mosquitos, and
Fernandina to determine the extent of the damage in those places.
Farmers with undamaged crops gathered provisions and shipped
them to St. Augustine as quickly as possible. Food became one of
the most important commodities, but palmetto thatch to repair
roofs also would have been in great demand. After forty years of
refinement, the relief process worked like a well-oiled machine.
Within one day, the leader of the military garrison at Fernandina,
Justo Ldpez, wrote to Estrada describing the minimal damage
there. Given L6pez's experience in Cuba, he already gathered
supplies to send south to St. Augustine. Although the hurricane
surge had created a sandbar that blocked the mouth of the St.
Mary's river, smaller boats could still navigate an open channel
and sail to the stricken
44. Jost? Skchez, "Relacicin . . . Barrio Contaduria," St. Augustine, 23 October
1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Census Returns, Census of 1793, 28, 69, 93,
bundle 323A, reel 148, both in EFP; Johnson, "Casualties of Peace," 118-19;
idem, Social Transfmmation, 150-51; Estrada to Someruelos, St. Augustine, 6
December 1811, legajo 1570B, PC, AGI.
45. Justo LBpez to Estrada, Fernandina, 7 October 1811, bundle 147D12, reel 61;
Justo Upez to Estrada, Fernandina, 28 October, 4 November 1811, bundle
147D12, reel 61, both in EFP.
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The death toll appears to have been surprisingly low given the
intensity of the hurricane; the comisarios' reports identify only
three men who died in the storm. Josi Dulcet, Salvador Martin,
and Antonio Mestre lived in the most dangerous zone, in barrio
Quarteles close to the waterfront. While listed in reports as
"deceased," curiously their names do not appear in corresponding
parish records, strongly suggesting that they drowned in the storm
surge and their bodies were never recovered. Without proof of
death and burial, no entry would appear in parish records. Both
sets of records are also frustratingly vague about the postdisaster
fate of Josi and Maria Buchany, two orphaned minor children who
seemingly lost their guardian and their home.46
All in all, the hurricane inflicted monetary damages totaling
more than 65,000 pesos. Individual damage estimates ranged
from thousands of pesos to a mere eight-peso loss for used clothing. Barrio Quarteles reported the largest amount: 23,963 pesos.
Losses in barrio Contaduria were 21,2 10 pesos. Barrio Iglesias suffered damages estimated at 11,045; and barrio Castillo reported
the smallest loss at 9,323 pesos. Not surprisingly, homes and businesses near the waterfront suffered catastrophic damage while
modest houses near the western edge of the town more successfully withstood the wind and water. Nonetheless, as Estrada
poignantly wrote about all of the residents: "because of their poverty. . . these poor people . . . are entirely ruined."47
In better times, damage reports would be sent to Havana and
then on to Madrid where they would be examined by the king's
ministers in order to recommend fair and adequate assistance.
Such compensation could be monetary, but more often it came in
the form of lowered taxes or a moratorium on paying certain obli46. Papy, "Relaci6n . . . Barrio Qyarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Jose Sainchez, "RelaciBn . . . Barrio Contaduria," St.
Augustine, 23 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, both in EFP. Neither
White Deaths, 18041882 nor Colored Deaths, 17841821 (both reel 284L,
CPR) lists any deaths that may be attributed to the storm from the time it hit
on October 5 through the early months of 1812.
47. Papy, "Relaci6n . . Barrio Quarteles," St. Augustine, 26 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Jose Sa;nchez, "Relaci6n . . Barrio Contaduria," St.
Augustine, 23 October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84; Joaquin Sgnchez,
"Relacibn . . . Barrio Yglesias," St, Augustine, 15 October 1811, bundle
198C16, reel 84; de Oca, "Relaci6n . Barrio Castillo," St. Augustine, 21
October 1811, bundle 198C16, reel 84, all in EFP; Estrada to Someruelos, St.
Augustine, 9 December 1811, legajo 1570B, PC, AGI.
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gations to the royal treasury. Wealthy residents who contributed to
the relief fund could expect concessions, such as a government
position for themselves or a family member. But times were not
good anywhere in the Spanish empire in 1811. Since 1808, the
treasury had been bankrupt, the situado had not arrived for years,
and it was hopeless to believe that the tight-fisted captain general
would be forthcoming with relief to meet such extraordinary
expenses. Again, Juan Jose de Estrada devised a solution: he
requested that the merchants of Fernandina donate to the recovery. In times of emergency, royal officials routinely asked wealthy
people and those who escaped harm to help out and alleviate the
misfortune of the fellow citizens. Although some degree of coercion was almost always imputed in government requests for "voluntary donations," also implicit in the request was that those who
stepped forward to help in times of trouble could expect some
reward in the near future.
This implicit reciprocity was the case in the aftermath of the
St, Augustine hurricane. Estrada requested immediate help from
the surrounding areas, and simple humanitarianism, family ties,
and friendship between the residents of Fernandina and St.
Augustine encouraged the northern townspeople to help their fellow Floridians. To no one's surprise, barely three weeks after
emergency supplies arrived in St. Augustine, twenty-three merchants from Fernandina petitioned Estrada and treasury official
Manuel L6pez about how business had suffered because of high
taxes. "To avoid the ruin of the commerce of the port," they suggested a reduction in the amount paid to conduct business. The
list of names included prestigious men of Spanish, Minorcan, and
Anglo origin, among whom were Pedro Cosifacio, Juan Rafo,
Fernando de la Masa Arredondo, Bernadino Siinchez, Bartolomi
de Castro y Ferrer, and Gabriel Perpal-all had also lost property

48. Justo G p e z to Estrada, Fernandina, 25 November 1811, bundle 147D12, reel
61; Estrada to Justo Lbpez, St. Augustine, 27 November 1811,bundle 147D12,
reel 61, both in EFP. The complete list of names includes Felipe Roberto
Yonge, Guillermo Lawrence, Santiago Cashen, Juan Kiehn (Kean?), Carlos
Seton, Samuel Betts, George Cook, Archibald Atkinson, Pedro Cosifacio,Juan
Rafo, Fernando de la Masa Arredondo Jr., Fernando de la Masa Arredondo
Sr., Josef Hernandez, Jorge Atkinson, Bernadino Shchez, Bartolomi de
Castro y Ferrer, Francisco Rovina, Bernardo Segui, Gabriel Perpall, James
Lee, and Anastazio Hull; see Merchants of Fernandina to Estrada,
Fernandina, 26 October 1811, legajo 1570B, PC, AGI .
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in St. Augustine. Still, original relief efforts were not enough, and
a month later, residents of St. Augustine remained in dire need.
In November, Fernandina commandant Justo Liipez wrote the
governor relating that, on their own initiative, he and Fernando de
la Masa Arredondo had solicited donations to continue helping
hurricane's victims. Estrada's words brimmed with gratitude as he
sent his most sincere thanks and closed his letter " that he would
do everything" to support the donors in Fernandina, and that they
would "always be worthy of my greatest esteem."48
In December, Estrada put together a package of letters bound
for Cuba that would be forwarded on to Spain. At the top after his
report about the hurricane was the petition from Fernandina's
merchants along with Estrada's personal expression of gratitude
and his recommendation that their request be granted. A letter
from Luisa Ruiz de Canto asked for a pension and was accompanied as well by a supportive letter from the governor. Finally,
Estrada included his summary of the consequences of the storm:
"The losses that the residents suffered according to the evaluations
that we made immediately after the hurricane will top 65,000
pesos." An astute and experienced royal official, he knew that the
treasury was bankrupt, so he justified his decision to accept relief
from the merchants, writing that "I have done everything possible
to get what is necessary to console these poor people." His explanation also reinforced his recommendation that the generosity of
Fernandina be generously rewarded. Finally, Estrada commented
on the character of East Florida's residents: "[they] are entirely
ruined but [they] have managed to survive with a great deal of
patience."49
One of the greatest enigmas of the Second Spanish period is
the unwavering loyalty of the majority of the population. What
could have been-indeed, what should have been-a total breakdown of civil and military society in Spanish Florida after the hurricane of 181l did not happen. Conditions were ripe for rebellion
ifrebellion and independence from Spain really were desired by
the populace. By January 1812, two choices faced East Florida's
residents: on one hand, General Matthews's invasion force awaited
across the St. Mary's River, with only previous experience as their
guide; on the other hand, they could compare the general's prom49. Estrada to Someruelos, St. Augustine, 9 December 1811, legajo 1570B, PC,
ACI.
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ises with the recent actions of their Spanish governor. Even before
the storm struck, Estrada had offered conciliatory measures to
both Anglo settlers and Seminole tribes. In the aftermath of the
hurricane, it was clear that emergency measures included everyone. No one was excluded from the responsibility to help or from
sharing in the generosity of their neighbors: neither rich nor poor,
nor invalids, free people of color, women, or children. Estrada's
response continued the policies of previous decades, and in so
doing, the positive governmental response sustained Spanish
Floridians' feelings of community and loyalty to the empire.
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